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The Death and the Resurrection of (Psy)critique: The Case 
of Neuroeducation 
Abstract 
 
A rapidly emerging hegemonic neuro-culture and a booming neural subjectivity 
signal the entry point for an inquiry into the status of the signifier neuro as a uni-
versal passe-partout. The wager of this paper is that the various 
(mis)appropriations of the neurosciences in the media and in academia itself point 
to something essential, if not structural, in connection with both the discipline of 
the neurosciences and the current socio-cultural and ideological climate. Starting 
from the case of neuroeducation (the application of neuroscience within educa-
tion), the genealogy of the neurological turn is linked to the history of psychology 
and its inextricable bond with processes of psychologisation. If the neurological 
turn risks not merely neglecting the dimension of critique, but also obviating its 
possibility, then revivifying a psy-critique (understanding the academified mod-
ern subject as grounded in the scientific point of view from nowhere) might be nec-
essary in order to understand today’s neural subjectivity and its place within cur-
rent biopolitics. 
 
 1. Introduction 
It has been argued that the neurosciences, in the space of only a few decades, have 
spawned both a hegemonic neuro-culture and a neural subjectivity—i.e. Fernando Vi-
dal’s “cerebral subject” (Ortega and Vidal 2007) and Nikolas Rose’s “neurochemical self” 
(Rose 2006) . How we experience ourselves and the world is said to increasingly hinge on 
neurological rather than “psychological and internalistic notions” (Ortega and Vidal 
2007, p. 255). As such, it is evident that within numerous scientific and para-scientific 
fields the prefix neuro has become ubiquitous. In this way, then, approaches such as 
neuroeducation, neuropolitics or neuroaesthetics are prone to have an important bear-
ing on our contemporary life-world and shape significantly our self and world experi-
ence. 
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But something strange happens when the signifier neuro becomes the universal passe-
partout: that is, it becomes a voracious black hole. To put it bluntly, one could argue 
that in mainstream and/or popularized neuro-approaches, not only is there not much 
neuroscience to be found, but neither is there much of the host discipline to be found 
either. Neuropsychology, neuroeducation, neuropolitics, neuroaesthetics, for example, 
often have very little to do with actual neurology, nor psychology, education, politics or 
aesthetics for that matter. Just consider (popular) neuropsychological issues such as 
ADHD, dyslexia, autism and such like. On the one hand, the firm assertion of their neu-
rological causes is only superfluously fleshed out—as (vast) research on these disorders 
has failed to live up to the promise to deliver the final and categorical proof of their or-
ganicity (for an excellent critique see Timimi et al. 2010; Timimi and Radcliffe 2005). 
While, on the other hand, these tropes jeopardize the very conception of the psyche or 
the psychological. Hyperbolically speaking, the average psychologist working with the 
DSM categories as a rule rejects the psychological dimension.1 
 
One could consider such instances as marginal trends in academia or mere popularized 
aberrations. But what if those blunt and misplaced expropriations of the neurosciences 
actually tell us something essential about the neurosciences themselves, and, in particu-
lar, about the allying of the neuro with the sciences? That is, the eagerness with which 
academia and the broader public has embraced the neurosciences is perhaps not only 
symptomatic of specific academic praxes and the wider socio-cultural constellation 
generally, but also has profound relevance for our attempts to understand the function-
ing of the neurosciences themselves today. Hence, the challenge is to connect the condi-
tions of (im)possibility of neurology (as the latter is inevitably embedded in cultural, 
political and popular contexts) to those of the other sciences (as these seek to ground 
their own terms of (im)possibility in the supposed firm and neutral body of knowledge 
of the neurosciences). 
 
The urgency of these questions stems from the fact that the neurological turn risks not 
only neglecting the dimension of critique, but also obviating its possibility. For if the 
signifier “neuro” does in fact explain it all, then there is no longer an outside, a beyond, 
from where a critical approach could begin. Or might it be, as some argue, that the criti-
cal potential has to come from within the specific realm of the neurological itself? In 
any case, given the hegemonic neuro-culture and neuro-subjectivity, all this is bound to 
affect current modes of understanding ourselves and the world. 
 
In order to approach these broad and far-reaching issues, it might prove expedient to 
perform a closer examination of both neuropsychology and neuroeducation. As the 
neurological turn is said to replace psychological subjectivity with so called “brainhood” 
(Ortega and Vidal 2007) the neurosciences are also increasingly invoked as the final au-
 thoritative source concerning how we should conceive of education and parenting. 
Looking at praxes in schools and in parenting counseling one could go as far as to speak, 
not just of a neurological turn, but in terms of a neuro-tsunami, hailing everybody, both 
pupil and parent, into the neuro-discourse. What, one might ask, will be the effects if 
soon all generations become immersed in the hegemonic neuro-discourse? A closer ex-
amination of neuroeducation will allow us to resist the temptation of putting forward 
the disclaimer that processes of neurologisation are only secondary ones and, thus, that 
the neurosciences themselves can be rescued from all this. In fact, from taking a critical 
look at neurological research on education the properly radical conclusion to be drawn 
is that neurology and neurologisation are two sides of the same coin and hence are co-
originary. 
 
 2. The Vantage Point: Old Psy-critique? 
In search for a ground on which to base a critique of the neurological turn, Foucault’s 
question “(w)hat is critique?” immediately brings us to the core of the matter. Following 
Kant, Foucault argues that post-Enlightenment humanity was going to put its own rea-
son to use, without subjecting itself to any authority: 
... now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is 
that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in or-
der to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped 
(Foucault 1984, p. 38). 
Arguably, the figures of authority and sovereignty are replaced here by the impersonal 
agency of the discourse of Science and expert-knowledge. That is, if emancipation from 
authority is to pass through reason and knowledge, the modern sciences are bound to 
play a pivotal role. One might argue that in modernity critique is inevitably scholarly. 
Ideological or political critique, for example, thus necessarily assumes the form of an 
academic discussion. Just consider how when policies and politicians are criticized, sci-
entific arguments suddenly pop-up which draw upon economical sciences, climatology, 
demography, etcetera, alongside, where possible, the use of the neuro-prefix (e.g. neu-
ro-economy, neuro-ethics...). For example, Rush Holt (scientist and politician) writes in 
Nature that “(p)oliticians should think like scientists,” (Holt 2012). Herman Van Rompuy 
(president of the European Council) urges political leaders to take onboard positive psy-
chology as it “concerns itself in a scientific way with the quality of life” (my italics, Van 
Rompuy 2012). And Matthew Taylor, Labour party activist and government adviser un-
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der Tony Blair, contends that insights from neurological research can offer a more solid 
base “than previous attempts to move beyond left and right” (Taylor 2009). 
 
It is also crucial, however, to observe how the so-called layman increasingly adopts aca-
demic discourses in his or her exertion of reason and critique. Think about how rapidly 
and recurrently the expression “did you know that according to science...” is evoked in 
discussions about food, health, relations, etcetera. Or, to turn to the field of education, 
consider how parents when criticizing the school often do so in scientific terms: the 
teacher either does not possess the requisite pedagogical skills, or lacks knowledge 
about learning disabilities and developmental psychology. 
 
In this way it seems that we are all critical—if not, all too critical. Let me cite the exam-
ple of a remarkable campaign in Belgium which seeks to demystify the taboo around 
mental illness. “Te Gek”2 is a kind of critical psychiatry movement that wants to mobi-
lize a broad audience around the message that being mad is not wholly different from 
being normal. Concerts, theatre performances, exhibitions, a television documentary 
series, carnivalesque marches, etcetera., all convey the message that being mental is OK, 
if not, in fact, hip. However, we should ask from where, from within which discursive 
position in other words, such an utterance is being made. In the television documentary 
series, for example, it was blatantly clear that everyone –the experts, the policy makers, 
the critics, the teachers, the parents, and the mad themselves—share one and the same 
discourse: an academic discourse on mental illness. A young man with ADHD, fluently 
enumerating the DSM-criteria, told of how, for example, he had been able to turn his 
ADHD into a positive asset. A girl with ASD (autism spectrum disorder), in turn, said she 
was happy that her parents, her friends and the people in her school were well ac-
quainted with the disorder and where thus able to help her. Should we not be more than 
a little suspicious, however, of how everyone has seemingly adopted the academic psy-
talk so as to define mental problems as something common and natural? A telling ob-
servation, in this regard, is one which occurred in a ludic march of the Te Gek-campaign 
(with celebrities and other people chanting and dancing), when the television cameras 
suddenly turned to a lone figure dancing awkwardly and isolated from the motley crew. 
It was a figure of whom one could think: amidst all these beautiful people, this is the 
only one who really could come from the asylum. This figure, through the uneasiness he 
provoked, problematised the easy celebrative and carnivalesque critique, starkly 
demonstrating how the latter can actually result in a levelling out and denying of (psy-
chic) sufferance. 
 
As such, it is clear how this highly-marketed campaign, involving the mobilisation of 
celebrities and artists and the organization of ludic and artful activities, implies a specif-
ic subjective position from where everybody is called upon to “do normal in relation to 
 mental disturbances”. This position, I want to argue, is analogous to the much critiqued 
position of the multiculturalist who proclaims his solidarity and defends cultural differ-
ences precisely from a universal point allegedly transcending all these contingent dif-
ferences (see, for example, Žižek 1997). It is from this superior universal and academi-
cally informed vantage point that both the multiculturalist and today’s critical psychia-
try-activist claim to speak on the behalf of everyone. If the basic message is that taboos 
have to be demolished and supplanted by a positive and correct image of mental disor-
ders, then everyone is called upon, as such, to join the position of those who ostensibly 
know better. Hence, by singing, dancing and marching alongside celebrities, everyone 
partakes in the detached, external meta-point of view, in turn, turning the sublunary 
world into a screen onto which a particular, academically informed, world-view is pro-
jected. It was this carefully constructed imaginary scene which was momentarily prob-
lematized by the awkwardly dancing man who thus represented a profound critique of 
the comfort-zone of the righteous. 
 
However, is this not a reproduction of an old form of psy-critique, that is, criticizing the 
unacknowledged vantage point into which the psy-sciences used to hail the layman?3 
Indeed, psychology never succeeded in solving (or simply taking into account) the para-
dox of the redoubling of agencies in which its discourse and praxis inevitably results. 
That is, psychology’s knowledge necessarily takes the form of, “you are wrong about 
yourself and others”, and this epistemological denouncement leads to an, albeit not al-
ways explicitly stated, ontological claim: “that’s what you are”. For example: “you think 
you are altruistic, but actually you are only looking after your own genes”. Here, the 
interpellated subject is redoubled: “look, that’s who you are” is answered by “oh, really, 
is that what I am?” Therefore, if psychology psychologizes the subject, then this means 
that it puts the subject in a meta-position beyond its own psychology; as a kind of neo-
Cartesian cogito it contemplates itself and the world via the discourse of psychology (De 
Vos 2012). But if the Cogito (offering the modern subject an, arguably, academic vantage 
point to look upon itself) was first denounced as illusory by the deconstructionist ap-
proaches (e.g. Derrida, Deleuze), then the final death blow came at the hands of the neu-
rosciences: brain scans showed that there is nobody at home in the brain (see, for ex-
ample, Dennett 1991; Metzinger 2003). Hence, with the neurological turn, one could ar-
gue that the paradigm of psychologisation, which underpinned the psy-sciences, has 
come to an end; there is no beyond neurology. However, some caution is warranted 
here: it still remains to be seen whether the neurosciences really succeeded in doing 
away with the hidden and denied transcendental vantage point of psychology. On the 
contrary, it could be that the psychological/psychologised Self is still the spectre haunt-
ing the neurosciences. It is this which I will explore in the next section via a closer look 
at the domain of so-called neuroeducation. 
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 3. Neurological Research: Bridging Two Problematic 
Banks? 
The emergent discipline of so-called neuroeducation, significantly, often explicitly dis-
tances itself from the hasty, popular or commercialised misappropriations of the neuro-
sciences. Denouncing the so-called naïve “neuromyths”, the argument is invariably that 
educational practice should be grounded in ‘sound’ neuroscience. It is contended that it 
is time to carefully assess what is truly useful for education and, moreover, to inform 
the neurosciences themselves on the specificity of the educational context, in order that 
relevant research will be generated (see, for example, Patten and Campbell (2011) and 
other papers in that special issue of Educational Philosophy and Theory). Balanced as 
this stance appears at first glance, the question again concerns whether the neuromyths 
are merely an unfortunate, academically-unworthy issue urging us to “separat[e] sci-
ence from speculation” (OECD 2002, p. 69), or whether, alternatively, the neuromyths 
tell us something structural about the educational and neuroscientific fields, and at-
tempts to merge the two. 
 
To begin with, the neuroeducational approach demonstrates how neurological research 
attempts to bridge two problematic fields: on one plane, the mind and its psychology; 
and on the other, the brain and its physiology. Let us refer to a typical neuroeducational 
systematic review paper, which argues that the neurosciences offer us an understanding 
“of how the brain learns new information and processes this information throughout 
life” (Dumontheil and Blakemore 2012, p. 109). According to the authors, Iroise Dumon-
theil and Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, this is not only significant for specific learning areas 
such as mathematics and reading skills, but also for the field of social cognition, which, 
as they note, has been shown to be related to the structural and functional development 
of the prefrontal cortex. The crucial thing to note, here, is that the principal rationale of 
such research is to establish a parallel between the mind and the brain, between psy-
chological variables and brain regions. The critique that argues that this amounts to a 
form of neo-phrenology is often countered by the argument that neuroscientists nowa-
days envision the activity of neural networks across the whole brain. However, there is 
little to be gained here: understanding social intelligence, for example, as “a network of 
neural regions that comprise the ’social brain’: the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), superior 
temporal gyrus (STG) and amygdala” (Baron-Cohen et al. 2008, p. 1891) only repeats the 
localization stance. But perhaps a more fundamental point might be: what if the two 
things which one wishes to connect (psychological or subjective variables and brain ar-
eas) are in themselves problematic? Let us consider momentarily how Dumontheil and 
 Blakemore connect social cognition to the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC); in their re-
view of the literature they argue: 
In each of these studies, MPFC activity was greater in the adolescent group than in 
the adult group during the mentalising task compared to the control task (see Fig-
ure 2c and Blakemore 2008). The mentalising tasks ranged from understanding 
irony, which requires separating the literal from the intended meaning of a com-
ment (Wang et al. 2006), thinking about one’s own intentions (Blakemore et al. 
2007), thinking about whether character traits describe oneself or another famil-
iar other (Pfeifer et al. 2007, 2009), watching animations in which characters ap-
pear to have intentions and emotions (Moriguchi et al. 2007) and thinking about 
social emotions such as guilt and embarrassment (Burnett et al. 2009). In addition, 
there is evidence for differential functional connectivity between MPFC and other 
parts of the mentalising network across age (Burnett and Blakemore 2009) 
(Dumontheil and Blakemore 2012, p. 104). 
While Dumontheil and Blakemore appear to consider “character traits,” “intentions,” 
“guilt and embarrassment” as neutral parameters from which brain imaging can depart, 
one should firmly reject that these would be natural or independent variables: rather, 
they originate in specific theories of the psychology of emotions. Hence, even though 
these theories might be backed up with psychological research or experiments, it is im-
portant to point to the pre-conceptions and theoretical assumptions underlying notions 
such as “emotions” and “social cognition”. Simply put: what is laid under the scanner is 
not the psyche, but, rather, psychological theory. Here, it is evident that the neurologi-
cal turn is certainly not the end of the psychology: the point of departure for neurologi-
cal research is inevitably still psychology and its assumptions, which serve to provide 
the initial material and research base for neurology. Hence, also, the tautological risk: 
psychology is supposed to underpin neurological research while the latter is more and 
more evoked as the final proof of the scientific validity of the psychological theories 
themselves. Moreover, one could argue that fMRI, and similar imaging research, neces-
sarily depart from very basic and simple theories of the mind as these have to be easily 
operationalized in the very basic and straightforward laboratory settings of neurologi-
cal research. Both the very practical restrictions of fMRI-research (e.g. the test person 
has to lay down, the head must be immobilized—technical problems which might be one 
day superseded), and the basic rationale of brain imaging (parallelism and correlational-
ism) thus demand a very straightforward, simplified theory of the human. In the re-
search cited by Dumontheil and Blakemore, for example, social cognition is made opera-
tional via mentalising tasks assessing the understanding of irony, the latter conceived as 
“separating the literal from the intended meaning of a comment” (Wang et al. 2006). In 
Wang et al’s experiment we have a very practical, binary point of departure: in situation 
A: the literal and the intended meaning match; in situation B: the literal and the intend-
ed meaning differ (Wang et al. 2006). This comes in handy in terms of brain imaging, 
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because fMRI also hinges on a binary division: regions of the brain light up or do not 
light up. The critique to make here is, of course, that the rather blunt conception of iro-
ny underpinning Wang et al’s research (the match or mismatch between literal and in-
tended meaning) rests upon a naïve and outdated theory of language, which presuppos-
es a simple and straightforward relation between signifier and referent. The broad ac-
cepted conception of “literal meaning” as always contextual, situational and communi-
cative is bypassed here with a simplistic, dichotomist research outline: 
Following the sincere or sarcastic comment, participants were asked to decide 
whether the speaker really meant what he or she said. Yes/no judgments were in-
dicated by pressing a button with the index or middle finger, respectively (Wang 
et al. 2006, p. 109). 
This ignores that irony precisely relies upon the blurring of such black and white, on 
and off reasoning. The task given to a fMRI-immobilised test subject could thus be 
thought of as rather unworldly and artificial, and hence completely irrelevant to under-
standing a real human being. 
 
However, even at the site of the brain, and the mere physiological (to which the psycho-
logical variables are to be matched), things might not be so straightforward. For what is 
observed in the brain actually depends on a range of presuppositions and postulations: 
what is a marker for brain activity; what is significant activity; how are brain areas and 
their boundaries defined... In this respect, brain imaging techniques, for example, have 
been substantially criticized for being both tentative and coarse (e.g. Álvarez 2011, p. 
101), and for relying on unacknowledged decision processes “embedded in local practic-
es of production, reception and communication” (Vidal 2009, p. 27). 
 
The fact that both sites, the psychical and physical, pose manifold problems is exactly 
why attempts to close the brain-mind gap have become highly problematic. In the 
Dumontheil and Blakemore paper, for example, the social cognition research allegedly 
reveals a decreased activation level of the MPFC region in adulthood. This is then ever 
so tentatively explained as: 
One possibility is that the cognitive strategy for mentalising changes between 
adolescence and adulthood. For example, adults may rely more on previous expe-
riences to interpret social situations than adolescents, who instead might base 
their judgement on novel computations performed in the MPFC. This possibility 
may be related to the skill learning hypothesis (Johnson 2011), whereby one re-
gion first supports a certain function, but another brain region may take over lat-
er in development, and according to which the PFC may be particularly involved 
during the learning of new abilities. A second possibility is that the functional 
change with age is due to neuroanatomical changes that occur during this period 
 (Dumontheil and Blakemore 2012, p. 104, my italics). 
 
Here, the ostensibly precise high technology of the neurosciences seems to end up in 
high speculation.4 As the banks are in themselves problematic, the attempt to bridge 
them lacks any firm ground. 
 
 4. The Not So Artificial Condition of the Subject in the 
Scanner 
 
The idea could be that, firstly, we need a more advanced neurology, one capable, for 
example, of scanning the brains of subjects in their natural environment—perhaps even 
without them knowing it. And secondly, that we should replace the simplistic on/of 
psychological models with more nuanced theories of the mind that incorporate decon-
structionist and interactionist critiques. However, this optimistic viewpoint would ne-
glect how in today’s neuro-research—always at risk of combining naïve objectivism with 
oversimplified psychological theories—there is a basic aporia to be discerned which we 
should address as such. 
 
In order to do so, let us once again return to Dumontheil and Blakemore: their basic 
point of departure is that the human being uses a “theory of mind”: 
An understanding of others’ mental states plays a critical role in social interaction 
because it enables us to work out what other people want and what they are about 
to do next, and to modify our own behaviour accordingly (Frith and Frith 2007) 
(Dumontheil and Blakemore 2012, p. 101). 
This is the so-called Theory of Mind approach (ToM), in which people are seen as quasi-
theoriticians having the ability to impute mental states (beliefs, thoughts and desires) to 
other people in order to explain and predict their behaviour (Leudar and Costall 2009). 
Would this not warrant a careful re-assessment of these positions? For, when a theorist 
meets a theorist, the situation might be that of the mirror maze in the sense that the 
expert-theoretician might easily be mistaken in his assessment of the lay-theoretician. 
Hence, a central issue which risks being overlooked in ToM, is the paradoxical twist of a 
primordial reflexivity: one has only access to oneself via a theory of mind. To para-
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phrase the quote above, one has to come to an understanding of one’s own mental state 
in order to work out what one wants and is about to do next. But even when ToM incor-
porates the idea that one theorizes about oneself, its problematic underlying assump-
tion remains that the human subject naturally is a theorizing and reflexive being, and 
that these natural capacities of reason5 are put to work in an institutionalised and for-
malised way in science. What is missed here, I would argue, is that the (self)-theorizing 
subject is a product of the advent of the modern sciences, as these interpellate or hail 
(to use Louis Althusser’s (2006) term) the subject into the scientific discourse. But, con-
tra Althusser, I contend that the primordial subjectivation does not concern that which 
the human is said to be but, rather, the identification with the objectifying vantage 
point telling he or she what they are. This is precisely what critics of ToM miss in their 
otherwise justified critique that these approaches have a strong individualizing tenet 
and reduce the social down to cognitive issues. Ivan Leudar and Alan Costall, for exam-
ple, reject the view of children and adults as “proto-scientists who treat other people 
with detachment, objectively, and in intellectual mode” (Leudar and Costall 2009, p. 11). 
However, what Leudar and Costall fail to account for is how, since modernity and the 
advent of the modern sciences, the modern subject can be said to have become the sub-
ject of science.6 As God ceased to provide full ontological closure, science and 
knowledge filled this vacancy, prompting the modern subject to trade the religious 
grounding of its being and adopt a theoretical outlook as the basis of its engagement 
with itself, the others and the world. 
 
This nexus of the close bond of subjectivation with theory and knowledge is the reason 
why modern psychology is inextricably bound to psychologisation: the self-reflexivity 
of the modern subject passes through psychology and its scientific knowledge. But does 
this not mean, then, that neurology will similarly fail to escape this and be, in turn, in-
extricably bound to processes of neurologisation? This is the only way in which we can 
understand the basic rationale of the research cited by Dumontheil and Blakemore: ado-
lescents, looked upon as nascent human beings, are expected to grow into the position 
of a theorist. Consider, once again, the “mentalising tasks” given to test subjects: under-
standing irony, assessing one’s own intentions, thinking about character traits, discern-
ing intentions and emotions... In these the test subjects are tested on their skills and 
competencies as (neuro)psy-theorists. They are called upon to take up a distance, and 
assume a theoretical vantage point, from where to look upon others and the world (and 
on oneself, of course).7 Within the field of neuroeducation, coming of age means to 
adopt a detached, objectifying rationalist-scientistic point of view. 
 
We should thus ask the following question: is the position of the test person who is im-
mobilised on the MRI-table and detached from their natural surroundings really that 
artificial? Of course, neurological research does not deal with the phenomenological 
 human in his or her life-world; it deals with the human being in its epoche. In this way, 
the immobilised fMRI-testsubject is the modern subject, engaging with the world only 
via the mediation of science and technology. Hence, the neurosciences have the subject 
of the sciences, the academified subject, as their principle research object, with only one 
problem, however: they do not know it. They hold on to the idea that they do research 
on the anthropological human animal, the naïve layman. This denial is particularly clear 
in Dumontheil and Blakemore’s paper: drawing upon an experiment that demonstrates 
that learning in the presence of a real person is more effective than the same lesson 
watched on a DVD, Dumontheil and Blakemore make the following comment: 
We need to ask whether online social networking, which is particularly popular 
with teenagers, is the same as real live interaction, or whether it might be denying 
the developing teenage brain important real life interactions (Dumontheil and 
Blakemore 2012, p. 109)? 
However, to put it in a somewhat caricatured form, weren’t the first people who spent 
hours in front of the screen, communicating above all via the computer, and having 
minimal “real live interaction” not precisely academic scholars themselves? Or, yet still, 
does the isolated youngster in front of their screen not resemble the immobilised test 
subject engaging in some non-real artificial activity? Hence, the obvious and frequently 
recited critique that fMRI-research represents the activity of people lying in a machine, 
not engaging truly in a real situation but, in actuality, only imagining this (e.g. Álvarez 
2011), overlooks the fact that the person in the MRI-tube—watching a screen, wearing 
headphones and manipulating a keyboard as he or she performs a task resembling an 
online computer game—is actually a very realistic characterisation of the late-modern 
subject. Albeit, of course, that this point is overlooked by the neurosciences themselves, 
as their fundamental basic presupposition is that they address and have access to the 
real human being. It is there that they miss the subject of the sciences, which adopts a 
secluded and isolated academic vantage point and whose virtuality in these late-modern 
times is increasingly played out on screens and in cyber environments. The basic aporia 
of the neurosciences is that the modern subject position only appears as a kind of acting 
out. 
 
This perhaps goes some way to helping us understand how in the conclusion of their 
paper Dumontheil and Blakemore finally direct the project of neuroeducation to its 
basic constellation: that of neuro-education, which I write with a hyphen in order to 
designate it with the meaning of education in neurology: 
Perhaps the aims of education for adolescents might usefully include a focus on 
abilities that are controlled by the parts of the brain that undergo most change 
during adolescence, including those described in this review: social cognition and 
the understanding and awareness of the potentially different perspective of oth-
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ers, abstract thinking and reasoning, and the ability to focus on one’s own 
thoughts in spite of environmental distraction. Finally, it might be fruitful to in-
clude in the curriculum some teaching on the changes occurring in the brain dur-
ing adolescence. Adolescents might be interested in, and could benefit from, 
learning about the changes that are going on in their own brains (Dumontheil and 
Blakemore 2012, p. 110). 
So the authors, here, wish that adolescents would trade their immersion in vid-
eo/gaming/facebook, not with real life but rather with colourful fMRI-scans and other 
brain imagery. This is where the neurological turn shows its affiliation with processes of 
psychologisation: its necessary obverse is neurologisation. In the neurological turn the 
late-modern subject is summoned to adopt the perspective of the neuroscientist, to 
share his Archimedean position, which actually amounts to the restoration of that 
which the neurosciences are supposed to unmask as an illusion: the unified agent look-
ing out towards the world from his detached position in the Cartesian theatre. So, con-
tra Jonna Brenninkmeijer’s assertion that in the theory and practices of neurofeedback 
“a brain is created besides the self” (Brenninkmeijer 2010, p. 118), I would argue that the 
first thing the neurosciences create is not the brain, inasmuch as it is a theoretical van-
tage point from where to look at it. Brennikmeijer’s argument about the paradoxical 
creation of a position seemingly outside itself must be specified: this is in the first place 
a scientific and theoretical position. That is, the interpellative power of the scientific 
gaze effects a metonymy of the subject: it shifts a place and moves up to the theoretical 
position. Hence, the traditional critique that states that the neurosciences and brain 
imaging add nothing to what we already know, save telling us more or less where it oc-
curs in the brain, neglects the fact that there is a surplus: the neurological/neurologised 
meta-subject having finally externalised and outsourced all psychology to its brain. If, in 
this way, the neurological turn remains within the same paradigm of psychology –as 
psychology is inevitably mirrored by psychologisation, hailing the modern subject into 
the position of the psychologist—then the (re)formulation of a psy-critique becomes an 
urgent task if we want to traverse the trickier slopes of the neurological turn. 
 
 5. The Resurrection of Psy-critique 
However, by resurrecting psy-critique, are we not foregoing the critical potential within 
the neurosciences themselves? This is the position of Adrian Johnston, for whom the 
traditional take from the humanities on the neurological turn wrongfully assumes that 
its critique starts, or, has to start, from a point outside of the neurosciences: 
 ... instead of us philosophically having to impose an external check on the scienc-
es, especially the natural sciences, in order to leave room for some of the things 
we might be interested in, and which we don’t feel can adequately be accounted 
for within the explanatory methodological frameworks of the sciences, we can, in-
stead, taking a Hegelian dialectical phenomenological approach, argue that at this 
point one can step back and see the natural sciences themselves developing out of 
their own resources a sense of their limitations, vis a vis the things that, philo-
sophically speaking, we are interested in. We can begin to account for how the 
sciences, on their own terms, are necessarily incomplete and that they can actual-
ly pinpoint the ways in which they’re incomplete (Johnston 2011, p. 167). 
Johnston’s argument is that other sciences (psychology, sociology...), alongside the pop-
ular press, misinterpret and deform neuroscientific findings, fuelling “the fictions and 
falsifications of a now-pervasive scientism functioning as a branch of biopower” (John-
ston 2011). Against neo-phrenology, Johnston, for example, contends that the practi-
tioners of neuroscience actually insist on the non-localizable character of the human 
mind . Their attention to the “social-historical cultural surrounding environments” 
makes them moreover interconnect “nature and nurture, the genetic and the epigenet-
ic, genotypes and phenotype” (Johnston 2008, p. 37). However, is it not clear from re-
viewing the predominant literature that the localization stance is still a dominant one? 
And, of course, as aforementioned, the network argument only repeats the localization 
paradigm. Moreover, regarding the approaches leaving room for nurture and culture, it 
appears that the latter will only be accounted for if traces of them are found in brain 
scans. The now fashionable recourse to epigenetics, mirror neurons and neuroplasticity, 
wanting to transcend eliminative materialism and to make room for the human and the 
cultural, thus always threatens to be overtaken by a still omnipresent reductionist mo-
tive: one way or another, the brain is the one size fitting it all. Think of studies indicat-
ing that social circumstances (e.g. poverty, lack of food, housing or shelter) have tangi-
ble effects on the brain: simply put, the cultural (and political) argument can only be 
made from the neurobiological side. Even if you want to argue that the mind is more 
than an epiphenomenon of the brain, the only valid proof for this will have to be 
grounded in neurology. This means that if, as Johnston contends, neuroscience itself 
harbours a critical potential, then this is not the solution, but, rather, the problem; or, at 
least, insofar as it claims to be able to grasp in its own terms even what is transcending 
it. Is the neurological, then, not the ultimate usurper, swallowing up everything that is 
solid, even the very possibility of understanding and/or of critique itself? 
 
However, all this hinges on the presupposition that neurology really can stand on its 
own and, thus, truly is the final explanatory framework. Against this we could argue 
that the neurosciences, structurally speaking, need to take recourse to something out-
side its own domain to both orientate and ground its research and praxis. And, as point-
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ed out earlier, it is here that neurology inevitably falls back on psychology. Parallelism 
and correlationism, the inevitable backbone of neuroscience, do not depart from natural 
givens, but rather from variables originating in the theory formation and praxes of psy-
chology. Here, the problematic status of psychology as a science itself cannot but have 
its effects. To explain this genealogically: the advent of the modern sciences, and their 
enormous potential to objectify, engendered the question of modern subjectivity. As 
science envisions the mastery of the totality of being “without anything left over”, as 
Edmund Husserl said (Husserl 1970, p. 22), subjectivity actually becomes related to de-
subjectivation. In contemporary terms: if you are but a function of brainwaves and evo-
lutionary mechanisms, then in the end there is not much you or subjectivity left. Psy-
chology thus came to light as the discipline, theory and praxis able to give form to this 
paradoxical emptied-out subject. But as psychology modelled its theory and praxis pre-
cisely on the objectifying paradigm (wanting to mirror the hard sciences), it only re-
peated the de-subjectivizing stance and, hence, necessarily and structurally missed the 
true, paradoxical (zero-level)subjectivity of the modern human being (De Vos 2012). 
Psychology, then, is the not unproblematic first informer of the neurosciences. Moreo-
ver, the prefix neuro is called upon precisely to overcome psychology’s problematic sci-
entific status, and to unify a field ridden by an eventful history full of contradictions, 
schisms and anathemas. The resulting circularity—of the neurosciences coming to the 
rescue of psychology while it itself is structurally dependent on psychology—is the un-
derlying structure of the neurological turn. As the neurosciences are structurally 
haunted by the ghost of psychology(zation), the importance of revivifying a psy-critique 
should be becoming clearer at this stage. 
 
In this respect, it is interesting that when Ortega and Vidal argue that psychological and 
internalistic notions of personhood are substituted by somatic “bioidentities” they re-
mark that the “neurobics literature” (a neologism contracting neurology and aerobics) 
reproduces “earlier commonplace self-help literature” (Ortega and Vidal 2007, p. 258). 
However, not only is neurobics merely the continuation of psychologising popular liter-
ature, it also demonstrates how the psychological agent of the Self (the agency deciding 
it is time to work on itself) is still addressed in the neurological discourses. Here, the 
typical redoubling of psychology (I look at myself as a psychological object) remains in 
place: I look at the neuropsychological thing I am said to be. The neurological turn 
hence should be understood as part of the psychological lineage.8 But, to reiterate the 
central argument of this paper, the construction of that transcendental vantage point 
(from where the subject looks upon itself as a (neuro)psychological thing) should not be 
too readily dismissed as merely the side-effect of the unfortunate phenomena of the 
double nexus of psychologisation and neurologisation. Rather, if the fundamental aim is 
to reinstantiate a psy-critique, and install it as a core-element in contemporary ideology 
critique, then the truly radical gesture is to value this Archimedean subject as a key el-
 ement, both structurally and historically, of the advent of modernity. The genealogy of 
the psychologised/neurologised subject hovering above itself is thus essential to under-
standing contemporary biopower. For example, does even Johnston himself not, in fact, 
reserve a fundamental transcendental, and not merely immanent, vantage point in his 
assessment of the neurological turn? For, even though he considers the critical potential 
to be fully enclosed within the neurosciences themselves, he still requires us to take a 
“step back” to look upon the natural sciences (see full quote above). It is precisely this 
“step back” itself which should be the central focus of a psy-ideology critique. We 
should, for example, not only elucidate how the neurosciences are, as Ortega and Vidal 
note, “embedded in the social fabric, rather than as merely having ‘social implications’ 
or an ‘impact’ on society” (Ortega and Vidal 2007, p. 256), for as true as this is, the claim 
to be above the social should be understood in its own right. That is, the modern sub-
ject, as a subject of the sciences, is called upon via the processes of academisation, psy-
chologisation and neurologization, to re-join that very Archimedean vantage-point. 
This point of view from nowhere, the un-embedded point, the ghost of the Cartesian 
subject, is precisely the origin of the sciences themselves. The emptied-out subject, fully 
objectified with all its particularities attributed to the general structure of neural mat-
ter, provides the alleged neutral point for science to ground itself. In other words, the 
(neuro)psychologised subject is the backbone of the sciences. Psychologisa-
tion/neurologisation actually produces the conditions of (im)possibility of the sciences, 
via the production of the neuropsychologised subject who looks at itself as a neuropsy-
chological object. 
 
It is only in terms of this Archimedean surplus subject that the dynamics of contempo-
rary biopolitics make sense. A case in point, here, is the discipline of neuro-education. 
For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
despite attacking the so-called neuromyths and the inappropriate use of the neurosci-
ences in education, considers it necessary that the public should be educated about the 
“gains due to cognitive neuroscience” (OECD 2002, p. 169). Neuroeducation, the imple-
mentation of neuroscience in education, hence should be taken literally: everyone (the 
pupil, the teacher, the parents, the general public) should be given lessons in neurology. 
Neuroeducation is neuro-education. If psychologisation hailed everyone into the psy-
chology class (De Vos 2012), then neurologisation represents the draft into the neuro-
sciences class. Contemporary biopolitics, then, is not an issue of “the fictions and falsifi-
cations” of bad theory and bad popular media (see Johnston), it is rather an issue of the-
ory itself. The neurosciences are inextricably interwoven with neurologisation, creating 
a surplus subject in the very excess of being hailed: “look, this is what you are” engen-
ders the concomitant response, “really, is that me?” The ideological move par excel-
lence is to be located precisely in this claim to be merely lifting the veils and revealing 
the nature of mankind. This is where the dynamics of redoubling is missed: it is the re-
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fusal to acknowledge that in the process of neurologisation the neurological sub-
ject/object becomes a pupil in neurology. For example, Marco Iacoboni, one of the 
members of the Italian team of neuroscientists that launched the concept of mirror 
neurons, rather inconspicuously argued in an interview for the popularization of the 
scientific insight that we are “wired for empathy”: 
. . . this explicit level of understanding of our empathic nature will at some point 
dissolve the massive belief systems that dominate our societies and that threaten 
to destroy us (Iacoboni 2007). 
Similarly, Steven Pinker cites Anton Chekov, “(m)an will become better when you show 
him what he is like” (Pinker 2008, p. 37). What both Iacoboni and Pinker show is that the 
neuropsy-sciences claims to relevancy in matters of politics is not merely about imple-
menting (neuro)scientific knowledge on the nature of mankind but, rather, about show-
ing man his alleged true nature.9 The fact that a politics based on the nature of man, has 
to pass through education, demonstrates that we are dealing fully with biopower: pro-
ducing and calling into life the late-modern subject, sitting in the Archimedean class, 
watching the blackboard, or rather an interactive whiteboard portraying colourful brain 
scans. 
 
 6. Conclusions: The Truth of the Mereological Fallacy 
Whether in popular appropriations of the neurosciences or serious scholarship in the 
field of neuroeducation itself, everybody sooner or later ends up in the class-room and 
becomes a scholar in neuroscience. In a paper by Darcia Narvaez on “moral neuroeduca-
tion”, for example, we cannot but notice the grand écart between, on the one hand, ser-
otonin, glucocorticoid, DNA synthesis and the hippocampus, and, on the other, “agreea-
ble personalities” and “child cooperation and behavior regulation” (Narvaez 2012, p. 
148). Neuro-education, educating the so-called layman into neuroscientific theories, is 
the paradigmatic attempt to close this gap. With Narvaez, this becomes clear as she de-
fines morality within a spectrum of development from “novice to expert”. Narvaez urg-
es the layman to read books on “mindfulness” and “socialize with people who cultivate 
it” (Narvaez 2012, p. 150). She thus speaks of “expertise”, “capacities”, “know-how”, 
“flexible innovative responses” (Narvaez 2012, pp. 149–150). Note here how the underly-
ing humanistic psychology shows its true face: portraying the pupil as an agent involved 
in “information processing, judging action, taking action” seems to be, far from a de-
scription of moral development, above all the description of the ideal information 
 worker within our digital era! Using current fashionable-terms such as epigenesis and 
plasticity, Narvaez writes: 
In contrast to passive epigenesis (what I call) active epigenesis (or active plastici-
ty) refers to the ability of the thoughtful individual to choose activities that trans-
form the self. Individuals can modify brain malfunctioning through a change in 
activities which modify neuronal functioning (Narvaez 2012, p. 149). 
Or, phrased otherwise: fine-tune your brain, or, even, fool your brain in order to make 
profit, and extract surplus-value from it. What is omitted in such positions is that the 
real surplus is the creation of a vantage point, a new, albeit empty, subject-position 
from where the levers are pulled. Narvaez, unwittingly, describes this as she defines 
mindfulness: “It means pulling oneself out of automatic responses to familiar contexts 
and paying attention to the newness in the situation” (Narvaez 2012, p. 150). Do we not 
witness here the return of the homunculus, the little man inside our head? While such 
an agency is generally denounced in the neurological turn as it presupposes some extra-
neurological transcendental notion, neuro-education shows that this Cartesian spectre 
is still haunting the neurosciences. The unacknowledged new homunculus, however, 
does not merely scrutinize sensory input and information flows, but actually is in con-
trol of the buttons that really matter: switching brain regions on or of, controlling 
chemical flows, if not by “singing, playing, dancing, laughing”, as Narvaez has it (Nar-
vaez 2012, p. 151), than with psychofarmaca. 
 
Is this version of “neurobics” not a consequence of the pitfall of the so-called mereolog-
ical fallacy that is said to be threatening both popular and scholarly approaches to neu-
roeducation? This fallacy involves ascribing to the parts of a thing attributes that can be 
ascribed only to the thing as a whole. That is, psychological attributes are allegedly at-
tributed to the brain while they can be intelligibly ascribed only to the human being as a 
whole (Bennett and Hacker 2003). This could be considered as the point of origin of the 
construction of a homunculus supposed to be capable of influencing and training its 
brain. If your brain is the one doing the thinking, feeling and knowing, then this calls to 
life an extra-agency mastering the brain and steering the thinking, feeling and knowing. 
In his paper, “Three requirements for justifying an educational neuroscience”, George G. 
Hruby considers the merelogical fallacy as a touchstone to differentiate between the 
“popular industry in brainbased educational methods, workshops, and materials” and 
the “serious scholarship and professional organizations dedicated to the coherent bridg-
ing of the neurosciences with educational research” (Hruby 2012, p. 2). Attributing be-
haviours anthropomorphically to the nervous system, he writes, would be like saying 
that one’s digestive system is having dinner (Hruby 2012, p. 6). For Hruby, the intuition 
that our brain does the learning, reading etc., stems from the computer metaphor of the 
cognitive sciences. Against the latter he argues: 
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For all their sleek interactivity, computers are texts: purely symbolic, from the 
icons on the desktop all the way down to the Boolean juggling of binary addresses 
denoting memory registers (Hruby 2012, p. 6). 
Hruby challenges this by conceiving of the human being as the “meaning-maker”. How-
ever, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this paper, perhaps the alleged logical falla-
cies of the popularizations of the neurosciences do, in fact, show us something im-
portant underlying so-called “serious scholarship”. Is there, for example, not a grain of 
truth in the fallacy which equates human beings with computers? The human being 
could be understood, after all, as a symbolic machine connected to the lifeworld in a 
symbolically mediated way. This means that one could, in actual fact, have the experi-
ence that it is one’s bowels which are demanding to be fed: the grumbling signals that 
the tummy is hungry. The subject can thus hardly be said to be the meaning-maker: 
meaning, rather, comes from the outside. The subject itself is but a point external to 
meaning; at the most it is the mere subjectum (the carrier) of meaning. Jacques Lacan’s 
dictum “a signifier represents the subject for another signifier” (Lacan 1978, p. 207) can 
help our attempts here to think of the subject as the relais between signifiers. The sub-
ject itself always falls between two poles: it does not coincide with its attributes, it is 
itself exempt from the realm of meaning. Moreover, from the advent of modernity and 
the modern sciences onwards, the realm of meaning is the jurisdiction of the sciences. 
As Lacan argued, the discourse of the master was replaced by the discourse of the uni-
versity (Lacan 2006). That is, knowledge became the principal term in the hegemonic 
discourse of power. This is a situation whereby it is no longer only the scholar but virtu-
ally everybody else too that knows that when the stomach growls this is due to muscle 
contractions of the digestive system. The modern subject is both the object of the para-
digmatic call of science “look, this is what you are”, and the subject-bearer of this hail-
ing: “oh yes, this is what I am?” Following from this, the subject is the point between 
two banks, a view from nowhere, a ghost in the machine which hovers (as if in an out of 
body experience) above its own brain/bowels. The failure to acknowledge this subject 
qua the view from nowhere is perhaps why Hruby describes the serious educational 
neuroscientists as having “the easy expertise in their twin fields to provide sage coun-
sel” (Hruby 2012, p. 10, my italics). That is, the unacknowledged Archimedean empty 
subject returns in the imagery of the devoted, wise and probably bearded professor in 
education who, from his academic panoptical tower, provides the ontological closure for 
the as such groundless neurosciences. 
 
This might, ultimately, be the true bearing of the mereological fallacy. The issue is not 
as much, as Bennett and Hacker contend, that it “makes no sense to ascribe psychologi-
cal predicates (or their negations) to the brain” (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 72), a point 
condensed by Frank Vander Valk as “the brain has no psychology” (Vander Valk 2012, p. 
11), rather, the crucial question is: is there anything else which would have a psycholo-
 gy? As aforementioned, due to the fundamental interpellative paradigm of the (neu-
ro)psy-sciences a surplus subject sees light which itself has no psychology. It therefore 
makes no sense to ascribe psychological predicates to no matter what or whom. As re-
cently psychology migrated from the person or the self to the brain, it shows itself to 
have always been a symptom, the symptom of the subject of the sciences. This means 
that one should not mistake the neurosciences as a threat to subjectivity. For, precisely 
via its popularizations and alleged misappropriations, the neurological turn reveals it-
self to be a vigorous attempt to save subjectivity, to build it up, to inflate it, or, to use 
the appropriate term here, to flesh it out. Just consider how the neurosciences (cannot 
but) deny the possibility that subjectivity can be flawed in its own right: the subject does 
not lose track of itself, it is always on track; when it is off track, some brain lesion or 
dysfunction is present, or will be found. As for neuroscience, there is nothing wrong 
with the subject, it is the ultimate attempt to safeguard the ego and the Cartesian cogito. 
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Footnotes 
1 
Consider how articles on ADHD often start with the explicit statement that it is not a 
psychological disorder (Zou et al. 2012, p. 403), or how this message is repeatedly con-
veyed to teachers (Hanks 2010, p. 91) and parents (Roberts 2006, p. 18). 
  
2 
Literally: “Too mad”. In Dutch it is also an exclamation utterance, meaning “awesome” 
or “cool”. See the website: http://www.sad.be/tegek/. 
  
3 
By ‘psy-critique’ I mean all the approaches which critically engage with the psy-
disciplines (questioning their scientific status, their conceiving/construction of a sub-
ject, their social and political meaning). Besides the Foucaultian perspectives (e.g. Rose 
1996, who coined the term psy- disciplines, disciplines starting with psy-, such as psy-
chology, psychiatry, or psychotherapy), the most important are the Marxist, phenome-
nological, humanistic and psychoanalytic strands of critiques of the psy-sciences (for an 
overview see Parker 1999, 2007). 
  
4 
One should acknowledge, to the authors credit, that many others when dealing with the 
same task of interpreting similar data, often trade this tentative way of writing for a 
firm and unambiguous style. 
  
 25 
 
5 
The assumption that people spontaneously theorize is most often explained from an 
evolutionary perspective (Leudar and Costall 2009). 
  
6 
See Jacques Lacan’s understanding of the modern subject as the subject of the sciences 
(Lacan 1966). 
  
7 
Perhaps this is also why the topic of irony takes centre-stage in this kind of research; it 
also testifies to a detached point, on the margins so to speak, from which to look upon 
the sublunary. 
  
8 
As already claimed by Scott Vrecko (Vrecko 2010). 
  
9 
Although Iacoboni would, of course, argue that this educational dimension connects to 
brain processes themselves, as he says: “It seems that people ’recognize’ how their brain 
works, when they are told about it” (Iacoboni 2007). But, then again, the unaddressed 
question is why people have to be told about it, why a meditative level is necessary? 
